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In his phenomenological works—works that are thematically centered 
above all around the question of the natural world—Jan Patočka increasingly 
referred to movement and lived/physical corporeality [Leib-Körperlichkeit], 
precisely because he conceived the concept of the world in terms of the 
correlation of life with its milieu.1 Patočka developed his phenomenology, in 
conjunction with Edmund Husserl’s late phenomenology of the lifeworld,2 by 
taking lived corporeality as his starting point and guiding motif in a way that 
is parallel to Merleau-Ponty’s work. Patočka himself saw that this accent on 
corporeality indicated a kinship with French phenomenology.3 In our 
opinion, such an emphasis was also one of the reasons why he kept his 
distance from Eugen Fink’s philosophical cosmology. And it is Patočka’s 
reference to this cosmological project that has had, and keeps on having, an 
important impact on the recent reception of his work in France.  
Thus not only does Patočka’s understanding of the lifeworld display the 
influence of French thinkers, but his work has become important for the 
development of phenomenological philosophy in France, particularly in one 
respect to which we shall limit ourself here: by virtue of his critical 
engagement with Eugen Fink, Patočka has become one source of the turn 
toward philosophical cosmology in French phenomenology, above all in the 
works of Renaud Barbaras, as well as in the work of authors he has influenced, 
like Pierre Rodrigo, and of some of their former PhD students working on 
Patočka.4 This is, of course, merely one moment in the abundant development 
of phenomenology in France, but it is an important moment that greatly 
enhanced the reception of Patočka’s work in general, and not only in France 
itself. 
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The World and Movement  
There is one passage that is cited especially often in readings of Patočka 
that are looking for a cosmology in his work. It accordingly seems important 
to take this passage as a point of departure in our presentation as well. This is 
a matter of a short reference—only a few paragraphs long—to Eugen Fink’s 
philosophical position, appearing in the second part of the Afterword to the 
new edition of the habilitation The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem. At 
the beginning of this text passage on Fink, which closes Patočka’s 
introductory part before he comes to a presentation of his own new position 
(namely, the theory of the three movements of human existence),5 he notes 
that with “a yet more unrepentantly speculative bent” than Heidegger 
displays with his notion of Ereignis,6 Fink has held it possible “to receive into 
an ontological context the world in the strong sense of the word, the 
independently existing world.” At the same time, he wonders whether this 
would effectively reestablish the “age-old” notion of physis as archē ruling in 
each individual.7 In a series of similar questions that already serve to indicate 
his distance from Fink, Patočka sketches the position of the latter’s 
philosophical cosmology in order to contrast it with Heidegger’s account of 
the history of being. It is only at the end of this passage that Patočka speaks 
of his own account, positioning it between Fink’s cosmology and Heidegger’s 
thinking of being as two different fundamental positions, writing: “The 
movement would be here the middle term between the two fundamental 
ways in which being uncovers existents and thereby shows itself to be their 
origin and ruling principle, arché.”8 
What, then, are the two ways from which Patočka’s presentation departs 
here, and how is movement related to them? Patočka addresses the contrast 
in the following way: what for us is the being of the existent—namely, the 
ground upon which we stand and upon which we ourselves are first the 
existent whose being consists in understanding (Heidegger)—is for the things 
time-space as the prior holistic, non-individuated framework of all 
individuation (Fink). Following this comes the reference mentioned on the 
way Fink characterizes this cosmic framework (the entire tenth section of the 
afterword preceding these remarks was devoted to Heidegger). This 
framework itself would not be an existent, but would merely be thematizable 
in terms of the relationships things enter into within this framework. The 
manifestation of things that makes this possible in the first place is not a 
manifestation for the subject, but a manifestation as arising or coming into 
being, as a “step into singularity.” It would be a manifestation to which the 
singularized things themselves are “inwardly indifferent”—a manifestation 
that is not revealing itself, but is submerged in the dark night of primal 
existents and primal being. So much for the way Patočka introduces Fink. 
Even if Patočka was undoubtedly inspired to a considerable extent by 
both accounts in formulating his own project, he does not subscribe to either 
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of them, as one can see in the publications appearing immediately after he 
wrote the afterword.9 We cannot find there any tendency of their author “to 
receive into an ontological context the world in the strong sense of the word, 
the independently existing world,” or correspondingly, to take up the notion 
of a contrast between appearing as appearing-to a subject with appearing as 
manifestation-of the world.10 His distance from these notions of Fink’s is 
linguistically expressed in the conditional mood in the concluding 
paragraphs, where he reports on both accounts, cosmology and ontology—
doing so, as already mentioned, in order to go on to present his own position. 
Here is the passage: 
Our own individuation, too, would belong to this universe 
of primordial individuation, encompassing everything 
which originally appears in its mere befalling, unfolding, 
coming to be and passing away, with no inner participation 
or interest in being. We ourselves, with the particular 
manner in which we single ourselves out from the world 
through inwardly relating to it, would participate in this 
primitive individuation. As in all other things, our being, 
too, would be a movement between coming to be and 
passing away, from its own beginning to its own end. Our 
specific movement, however, would be characterized by a 
non-indifference to being, an interest in our being and, in 
connection with it, in the being of what is in general, and 
this on the basis of a new manner in which being conditions 
what is—not merely in its coming to be and passing away, 
but rather as a clarity which makes possible an encounter 
within, inside of the universe, a clarity which reveals the 
universe in its connection with life.11  
Neither the beginning of this passage on Fink’s idea of individuation nor 
its final sentence on the “clarity which reveals” expresses insights that Patočka 
would reject. Yet neither the former nor the latter expresses what Patočka 
himself wants to say in critical connection with these positions. With his clear 
emphasis on lived/physical bodily life, he differs from Heidegger; at the same 
time, when it is a matter of grounding the individuation of beings in the 
understanding of their being, he seems to join Heidegger on this point, as 
opposed to cosmology.12 And it is the final word of the passage cited above—
“life”—that first provides the key to Patočka’s own account of movement. The 
lived/physical corporeality of life, which expresses the primal fact of 
pluralization into “separate life-centers” and the particular modes of 
individuation in each case, does not just mean that as a lived/physical body, 
the body is a vehicle for participating in the universal “movement from 
arising to passing away” to which all things are subject—hence a movement 
to which we too belong;13 the lived/physical body simultaneously signifies a 
divergence from such a movement of the world, a difference with regard to 
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it—and it is precisely this difference that is at stake when we speak of a 
difference from cosmologism in Patočka’s work. 
What Patočka is trying to do in this afterword is thus to take up the 
problematic of the natural world in a new way and to clarify his current 
position with regard to an old theme.14 Just as before, his interest still lies in 
clarifying the connection between world and life that he was speaking of in 
the passage cited above, even in the context of summarizing other positions. 
He will therefore be engaged with the notion of movement as a middle 
member, a means, a mediation, or a medium of the correlation of world and 
life. Here he is not dismissing the philosophical achievements of Husserl, 
Heidegger, Fink, or other thinkers; instead, the contribution they can make to 
the problem in question must be sought in the connection between their 
contributions and the considerations that Patočka himself now wants to bring 
to light. 
Thus at the beginning of the third part of the afterword, he turns to the 
natural world, “searching for life in its originarity.”15 Here he senses himself 
linked with the original aim of Husserl’s phenomenology, while also drawing 
upon Heidegger insofar as the latter “radicalizes the phenomenology of 
intentionality toward a phenomenology of life as existence” as well as taking 
advantage of Fink, defending “Fink’s idea of the ontological analysis of life as 
being necessarily, in each and every moment, an analysis of the world with its 
fundamental moments of time, space, and motion.”16 For Patočka, then, it is a 
matter of broadening the ontology of life into an ontology of the world, 
against the background of understanding life as movement. Starting from life 
as movement—indeed, “human life as dynamis”—the concepts of space, time, 
and movement are to return to “their original ontological import,”17 so that it 
is the world in its pregivenness that is to be clarified in terms of life as 
movement, and not the other way around. 
Here, giving the Aristotelian concept of movement a more universal 
scope plays a large role18—obviously, something that is likewise inspired by 
Fink.19 Patočka developed this theme in his historical treatise on Aristotle: His 
Predecessors and Successors, and was already considering a systematic 
application of this more universal notion of movement at that time. To be sure, 
passages testifying to this are rare, but the most important (though not the 
only) passage is found in Patočka’s correspondence.20 Once again, this might 
give the impression that like Fink, he was moving toward a philosophical 
cosmology. But Patočka did not take such a step at any time. Perhaps his 
philosophy can be criticized for the lack of any systematic synthesis of its 
many motifs, but it cannot be faulted on the grounds that his attempt at 
cosmology was a failure.21 As we have already noted, not only did he never 
develop such an attempt, but he never attempted such a task in the first place.  
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Renaud Barbaras’s Recent Critique of Patočka 
 
Renaud Barbaras has recently summarized his cosmological reading of 
Patočka22 in two essays, one on the “Ambiguity of the World” and the other 
on the “Repression of Life,”23 where he contrasts his own thesis of the 
preeminence of the “physical” movement of the world with Patočka’s 
interpretation of movement in terms of the primacy of our “spiritual” 
understanding of being. According to Barbaras, what is lacking in Patočka’s 
interpretation of movement is the truly corporeal dimension of our belonging 
to the world, since even life is repressed by the spirit: both belonging-to-the-
world and life itself are ultimately lost in favor of the spiritual movement of 
the understanding of being. In contrast to this, Barbaras emphasizes Patočka’s 
references to Fink’s cosmology in order to take them up for further 
development within his own project. Barbaras’s approach is based above all 
on the following short fragment from Patočka: 
Appearing as beginning from the obscure ground; that here 
there is a movement of appearing, a primal movement, can 
be read by analogy from secondary appearing, namely, 
from the appearing of the appearance that presupposes the 
coming into being of centers, of centrality: here the 
movement of transcendence creates a “world of its own,” a 
surrounding world [. . .]. Likewise, there must be 
something like movement through which the heart of the 
world creates its contingent contents, whose sediment is 
space-time-quality as a whole.24  
This passage, where Patočka is referring to Fink’s account—and the last 
sentence in particular—has become the occasion not only for an extremely 
influential interpretation of the phenomenology of Jan Patočka himself, but 
for Barbaras’s own phenomenological cosmology. 
However, as we have indicated, the context can also be read in a different 
way, not as a failed attempt at a philosophical cosmology that remains stuck 
in the transcendentalism of a fundamental ontology based on the 
understanding of being (and thereby in dualism), but rather as a critical 
dissociation from Fink’s cosmologism, one that likewise wants to distance 
itself from Heidegger’s primacy of the understanding of being—and indeed, 
wants to do so precisely by accenting the lived/physical corporeality of 
existence, something that Patočka expresses unmistakably and repeatedly. 
As proof of this, we can already cite a passage from the manuscript of a 
1968 lecture according to which the first movement of existence is “a 
movement that does not originally refer to the mode of being,” i.e., it proceeds 
instinctively, spontaneously, “in passivity and in accord with the world 
presenting itself, responding to the world’s incitement with the movement 
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that this elicits.”25 Thus here movement is not mediated by moods as forms of 
understanding of being, as Barbaras claims.26 Instead, sensuous life is set into 
motion from the outside, by something foreign, other than itself. This is 
certainly no denial of the cosmos and its effect on life—on the contrary. And 
yet the movement of life cannot be derived from such an effect of the cosmos, 
or of its movement, as a modality of it. What we are offering here is an 
alternative way of reading Patočka’s texts in critical continuity with Husserl’s 
transcendental-genetic account. For Barbaras, in its belonging-to-the-cosmos, 
lived/physical corporeality is reduced to and exhausted in the movement of 
the cosmos itself27—a movement equivalent to life, a movement in which 
everything worldly, including human life, participates. In contrast, for 
Patočka, what such lived/physical corporeality points to is a plurality of life-
centers, all of whom form, from their own inner and in reciprocal contact with 
other life-centers, the medium of external expression—the world. This 
dynamic cannot be interpreted as a participation in the movement of the 
cosmos itself or as an individuation of worldly beings from this movement. 
Such an interpretation can be found neither in the research manuscripts nor 
in Patočka’s published writings—it is only present where he is reporting on 
Fink’s account. For me, this is a clear indication that Patočka himself was not 
attempting any cosmological turn in Fink’s sense, although he really admired 
it. 
Even when Patočka mentions philosophical cosmology (as he does, for 
example, in a letter to Irena Krońska we shall cite in the next paragraph), his 
own contribution is consistent with the project of a phenomenology of the 
world as a whole based on the experience of this world-whole, exemplified in 
the asubjective transcendentalism of the world-form.28 Even the accounts that 
take movement as a starting point, such as the third part of the afterword, 
clearly do not yield a cosmology in Fink’s sense, but a type of transcendental-
phenomenological philosophy of life: it is not the cosmos, but “human life as 
dynamis” that restores to the concepts of space and time—and of movement as 
well—“their original ontological import.”29 And still, one seems to be able 
penetrate into “the realm of archai” by this route just as well as via Fink’s 
philosophical cosmology.  
Here is the passage from the aforementioned letter to Irena Krońska 
where Patočka uses these expressions: 
I’ve certainly wanted to rework my ideas on the natural 
world and human existence in light of new 
considerations—but I strongly doubt that I can still manage 
to do this. My new points of view are that the natural world 
is not a problem to be treated separately—one must first 
rediscover the world (simply as the world itself), and then use 
ontological considerations to base the human world, both 
natural and constructed, on it. This might seem to revive a 
metaphysical concept, but that would be to misunderstand 
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me, because it’s a matter of a phenomenology of the world 
(the ontology in question is a phenomenological ontology, 
not a metaphysical one), and my idea is that a 
phenomenology of the cosmological totality is a possible 
undertaking. This implies an entirely different 
methodological conception than the Husserlian 
“reduction,” a conception supported instead by 
considerations of modality in the manner of Fink, which 
allow me to establish the character of the world as 
irreducible [indépassable], considerations centered around 
the problem of the “barrier of language”—i.e., intra-
worldly expression applied to the totality; then a new 
theory of perception that dispenses with the traditional 
doctrine (above all, that of Kantianism) that one cannot 
experience the world as a totality.30 It would also be 
necessary to work out the fundamental distinction between 
a philosophical cosmology (aiming at the “essential” core of 
the world, beyond the opposition of fact and law, of the 
contingent and the necessary, penetrating into the core that 
totalizes and “governs” the world, the domain of archai) 
and a scientific cosmology tackling the secondary, 
contingent, factual contents of the world, a cosmology of 
which the sciences are parts or moments.31 
Renaud Barbaras and Pierre Rodrigo are right to point out, and even to insist, 
that when in certain passages Patočka gives the Aristotelian concept of 
movement a more universal scope, a possible bridge to cosmology is 
suggested, a bridge that Fink has actually built. But we would certainly add 
that this stands in contrast to Patočka, who for his part remains on this side of 
such a bridge, working on a phenomenology of the world. 
 
Pierre Rodrigo and His Accent on Symphysis 
In his numerous contributions to the interpretation of Patočka’s 
philosophy, Pierre Rodrigo too has relied on the influence of the Aristotelian 
theory of movement; for him as well, the interpretation and radicalization of 
this theory is a model for Patočka’s turn away from Husserl and Heidegger 
and toward a new theory of appearing in which the latter is neither reduced 
to a transcendental subject nor attributed to the history of being. Instead of 
remaining with appearing as such, which phenomenologists would 
typically—and ideally—do, Rodrigo writes of the necessity of post-
phenomenology posing the most difficult question, i.e., that of the logic of the 
way in which manifestation and phenomenalization are geared in with one 
another—what links and differentiates the way in which the beings are 
individuated and manifested of their own accord (the way in which they 
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arise) and the way in which the beings are perceived by living beings, are 
phenomenalized. The initial step toward this task is already decisive: namely, 
how is manifestation to be distinguished from phenomenalization in the first 
place. Fink first paved the way for this step with the conceptual pair, 
appearing-of [Vorschein] and appearing-to [Anschein];32 in this way he 
identified clear limits of phenomenology, which must accordingly give way 
in favor of a philosophical cosmology. For him, here cosmos must be truly 
distinguished from the modes of appearance of everything encountered in the 
world: the cosmos does not genuinely manifest itself as itself in these inner-
worldly appearances. 
To be sure, neither Barbaras nor Rodrigo are following Fink so far as to 
break with phenomenology, a break that Patočka and Merleau-Ponty did not 
even intend. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty and Patočka provided some 
inspiration for Barbaras to go beyond phenomenology and ontology toward 
a cosmological-metaphysical monism. Rodrigo seems to be inspired by the 
same move, developing arguments of his own—arguments for a post-
phenomenology that does call for a new metaphysics, yet without tending 
toward the monism mentioned. Rodrigo attempts to think through the 
concept of symphysis, a concept that Patočka once used,33 in order to 
formulate the most difficult question, that of the gearing-in of manifestation 
and phenomenalization. Here let us cite one formulation in which Rodrigo is 
following Barbaras: 
“The question that is certainly the most difficult is precisely 
to know if the movement that is ours—the movement from 
which the appearance properly so called proceeds [i.e., 
phenomenalization]—can truly be produced from the 
movement of manifestation. Can our phenomenalizing life, in 
its difference, be thought from the movement of the world, 
is its singularity rooted in a possibility of this movement?”34 
The entire post-phenomenological project does, of course, 
only make sense if the response to this question is 
positive.35  
Thus, while Fink unequivocally breaks with phenomenology (both with 
Husserl and with Heidegger, at least with the latter’s early hermeneutical 
project), post-phenomenology from Merleau-Ponty through Patočka to 
Barbaras and Rodrigo himself is seeking a new correlation between the self-
manifestation of the cosmos and the appearing of the phenomena of our 
lifeworld. And post-phenomenology attempts to decipher this correlation on 
the basis of the latter—of appearing itself. This project can find support in 
Patočka in that he wanted to establish, phenomenologically, the world as a 
whole, or appearing as such, as a structure. Post-phenomenology nevertheless 
goes beyond this in order to track down a genesis of this structure itself as 
well, and indeed, to trace it to a movement that brings all beings into being. 
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Thus we read as follows in the introduction to Pierre Rodrigo’s book, in a 
passage whose testimony we want to cite in extenso here: 
This means that the analysis of the structure of 
manifestation—as the structure responsible for there being 
existents-of-the-world, if one can formulate it this way—must 
be geared in with [engrenée] the structure of the appearance 
of the phenomena, a structure that is independent of the 
beings. To put it more technically, the “primary 
manifestation” of the world and of the existents-of-the-
world must be geared in with the “secondary 
manifestation” of the phenomena to “someone,” to a sum 
that is neither a transcendental ego nor a Dasein. For 
Patočka, this gearing-in [engrenage] is called “movement” 
as a phenomenological and metaphysical concept: 
movement of finite subjective life, “proto-movement” of 
the world and ontological movement (which is the sense of 
being that Aristotle glimpsed). It is this multiform 
movement that the 1968 manuscript on “Phenomenology 
and Ontology of Movement” names symphysis, i.e.—and as 
we shall see, this is a key point—a process of the growing-
together [devenir-ensemble], without a substrate, of all the 
existents that exist, but also a process of the growing-
together of being itself and everything appearing to an 
existent that is itself participating in this process—to an 
existent that is “in it,” as Merleau-Ponty would have said 
here. Of course, not everything in this difficult theorizing—
which concerns what we have called a new correlation 
between phenomenon and being—is fully carried through 
to the end.36  
This is a summary of a program (now related to the interpretation of 
Patočka’s thought, to which we limit ourselves here) that simultaneously 
indicates an internal problem of that interpretation and points to a solution 
based on something borrowed from Fink, namely, from his distinction 
between appearing-of and appearing-to, which for Barbaras become primary 
and secondary manifestation.  
I have already pointed out that Patočka had never accepted this 
distinction. And the place in Patočka that Rodrigo cites in the same passage 
we have just quoted from the Introduction to his most recent book—a place 
whose sense he follows in his own—belongs to the context of sketching an 
alternative to Fink’s cosmologism. Patočka explicitly terms what he is aiming 
for a “transcendentalism of appearing as such.” Here is the place Rodrigo 
cites, albeit without the initial sentence: 
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We believe that—as primary—the problem of appearance 
is the natural consequence of a transformation of the 
Husserlian theory into a formal transcendentalism of 
appearing as such. If the epochē means nothing other than 
returning from the supposedly pregiven world (the world-
construct and natural cognition) to the plane of 
appearances—i.e., to the appearance-characters that are 
nothing but characters of the understanding of being with 
respect to what is found in the being of the world, 
characters that are themselves no longer dependent on the 
occurrence of perceiving beings—then the primacy of 
appearing over being is obvious. One is no longer in 
danger—a danger tangible in Heidegger—of linking 
alētheia and pseudos, agathon and kakon, so tightly that there 
is the threat of a reversal of signs, that the penchant for 
doing this leads philosophical questions into a darkness 
with no way out. On the contrary, the primacy of appearing 
establishes the primacy of light; without negating darkness, 
the priority of the light is established.37  
Patočka’s most extensive manuscript on this theme thus ends with the 
paragraph just cited, where we find a profession of “a-subjective” 
transcendental phenomenology in its very first phrase.38  
I have cited both passages at length in order to indicate how Rodrigo’s 
reading, with its emphasis on symphysis, is perhaps nearer to Merleau-Ponty 
as a thinker oriented to the correlation of phenomena and being than to the 
cosmologists Barbaras and Fink. To put it in a nutshell, what is attempted with 
the new “post-phenomenological” figure of symphysis as the correlation of 
being and appearing is an intertwining of appearing and being on the basis of 
the analysis and interpretation of the logic of appearing itself, instead of 
proceeding with the speculative constructions of physis or of a cosmos that 
must still be distinguished from the world of phenomena—which is, by the 
way, something that Rodrigo never claims.39 When he takes over Barbaras’s 
difference between primary and secondary manifestation, it is not in order to 
use it as a means to subsume the secondary in the primary, thereby 
establishing a monism of the world in the strong sense of the word. To put it 
another way, for Rodrigo, Merleau-Ponty’s “intertwining” is and remains an 
important insight.  
In asubjective phenomenology, appearing is consistently detached both 
from the transcendental subject or Dasein and from what appears (which is 
thereby objectivated), so that appearing is lifted, as it were, into an autonomy 
of its own. In his transcendentalism, then, Patočka accordingly speaks of 
appearing as such as well as limiting himself in this project to the form or 
“structure” of this appearing, something that Rodrigo also mentions in his 
commentary on the first passage. The aforementioned internal problem of 
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interpreting Patočka’s philosophy then consists in describing how this 
“static” asubjective phenomenology, which concentrates on intuitively 
grasping a structure, is to be synthesized with the task of taking movement as 
a point of departure. And there is a letter testifying to the fact that this is not 
a matter of a problem external to Patočka’s own project, for in the following 
passage of the letter in question, he himself characterizes his project in a way 
that also suggests its relevance for Rodrigo’s question regarding the gearing-
in, engrenage, of appearing and being through movement:  
Moreover, I want to place the lifeworld in the middle, 
between the concept of the universe and the ontological 
concept of the world, relating it not to the reflectively 
grasped subject, but to fundamental movements of human 
life, with which the “objectivation” of lifeworldly 
references in action and cognition would first be linked [. . 
.]. I think that the determination of the relationship between 
the lifeworld, as an ontic concept, and the ontological 
concept of the world has never been carefully undertaken.40 
Yet while the inquiry here clearly proceeds from the movements of 
human life that are to replace the Cartesian construct of a reflectively grasped 
subject, for Barbaras and Rodrigo it is a question of thinking these movements 
too “from the movement of the world,” as we have seen above. With Barbaras 
it is increasingly a matter of metaphysically establishing a monism. 
Nevertheless, even though Rodrigo has some affinity for this development, 
he pursues an emphasis of his own, and therefore offers the following 
questions and remarks concerning Barbaras’s ontological project: 
Perhaps the “co-originarity of Being and Life” [Barbaras 
2013, 163] does not imply—if we remove the capital 
letters—some primordial level (or a level that is supposed 
to be primordial) of neutrality. Couldn’t it be, in effect, 
something on the order of an ecstatic mode or a dynamic mode 
of being—one that would be termed “distance” or “desire” 
from the side of the living being and “depth” from the side 
of the world.41 
We believe that this correlation—a correlation belonging to symphysis— 
is a correlation of life and of depth inherent to what surrounds life and makes 
it possible. And this also seems to us to be the emphasis in Rodrigo when he 
is reporting on the most recent development in the work of Barbaras, work 
that is compelled by the monistic logic of the latter’s thinking to reduce this 
duality too to the depth of the world: 
There accordingly remains an essential step to be taken 
after this post-phenomenological trajectory in order to 
dismiss dualism more radically, thereby “saving” the 
correlation—or rather, saving the careful theoretical 
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enterprise from betraying his monistic logic. This step is 
accomplished in the work entitled L’appartenance, where “[. 
. .] depth is, in other words, the originary mode of 
phenomenalization of the soil [sol], the inaugural presence 
of the ontological in the phenomenal.”42 Determined in this 
way, the soil founds and dynamically maintains a 
continuity of belonging-to with the phenomenal appearing 
that is like its other side, its own “metaphysical 
explosion.”43-44 
A phenomenologist would ask: how is the depth of the world given, and 
how is the world itself given? Depth is certainly not given in itself, but only 
with reference to something, like to a nullpoint of orientations, hence to the 
lived/physical body of the living being—properly speaking, only to humans, 
who—as the classical response puts it—long for depth and distance. For a 
phenomenological metaphysics, this would be a matter of a primal fact. In 
contrast, a world in itself that is never manifested to anyone is thinkable, or 
as Patočka would probably say, perhaps merely thinkable.45 For Rodrigo, 
however, even in post-phenomenology and its metaphysics, it is explicitly a 
matter of thinking anew the correlation that still links such anonymous 
manifestion with the phenomena that we living beings experience. And for 
Rodrigo, Patočka has pointed this out with his concept of symphysis. The way 
in which Rodrigo makes use of the concept nevertheless goes far beyond the 
sparse hints in Patočka himself. For Rodrigo, once again, symphysis is a 
“process of the growing-together, without a substrate, of all the beings that 
exist, but also the growing-together of being itself and everything appearing 
to a being that is itself participating in this process.”46  It is a merit of this 
author to put with this term of symphysis an emphasis on a new possibility 
of thinking the intertwining of being and appearing. 
 
Generalizing the Movement  
Patočka has recourse to this notion of symphysis in a manuscript from 
the end of the 1960s, “On the Ontology and Metaphysics of Movement.” This 
is not a matter of a text that has been completely worked out; instead, it 
consists for the most part of notes and excerpts. But what is important is that 
Patočka is obviously returning there to his idea of ontological movement from 
a certain distance. The initial notes of this document explicitly refer to 
passages in the Aristotle book where the idea of ontological movement 
originated, passages that are so thought-provoking—and not only within in 
the framework of the cosmological reading by Barbaras and his followers—
that they open up a path of their own that we shall selectively pursue here. 
Under the title “movement,” these notes of Patočka point right at the start 
to a fundamental duality: “1) If movement along ontological lines has the 
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particular aspect that in contradistinction to the concept of existents, it cannot 
be self-contained”—something toward which this concept tends via the 
notion of the determinations proper to the existent, making it an 
“independent substrate”—then “movement (even the most elementary 
physical movement) is only inwardly possible, as well as understandable and 
cognizable, when each determination is transcended in the direction toward 
the in-finite, toward the universe of existents. 2) Human experience—
relationship to entities, holding sway in the lived body and intervening by 
means of this in external reality, all of which [is] only possible through 
movement—movement-theory of perception, of willing, of human 
existence.”47 
In this sketch we do not find any one-sided inclusion of subjective 
movement in the movement of all-encompassing physis, or in the world in 
the sense of a cosmos; instead, we find a particular type of intertwining of the 
two types of movement, a motif that one can already find in Patočka’s early 
unpublished work, although not only there.48 Hence in the case of Patočka, 
we cannot find any attempt to derive all individual movements—both those 
of organic life as well as those of inorganic things—from a primal movement 
as its modalities. Instead, he speaks of their common denominator, of the 
general characteristic of these movements: here, movement means “the 
transition from non-being to being and vice versa,” or “simultaneously: to 
become something, i.e., to go from something’s non-being to being-
something”.49 
The emphasis on a “something” signifies the inner-worldly characteristic 
of these movements, while the world itself is not a something and cannot 
become one. We find this idea of a common character schematically repeated 
as a summary at yet another place in the same manuscript: 
There are two main forms of movement: a) objective 
movement α) location-movement, as sheer change of 
location β) “process”[;] b) lived movement, movement of 
psychophysical beings[.] The synthesis of both: social-
historical movement, objective movement resulting from 
the interplay of subjective movements[.] What underlies 
them both is the ontological nature of movement—
movement as transition from non-being to being or vice 
versa[.]50  
The thesis of an “ontological movement” as a common character of 
individuation both in living and lifeless existents is obviously a further step 
away from the idealistic theory of constitution and toward an “asubjective” 
phenomenology of the world as a whole. Nevertheless, the step from the idea 
of a common character of objective and lived movement to the thesis of the 
ontogenetic movement of the world in Barbaras and Rodrigo is too great a 
step, one we can find neither in Patočka’s published writings nor in his 
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working manuscripts and sketches. Instead, the world is to be interpreted not 
in terms of the cosmos, but in terms of life—we have already mentioned one 
passage.51 And for Patočka, life does not merely have an organic, 
lived/physical bodily dimension; moreover, when we read his later 
reflections on radicalizing the concept of movement, it is not merely a matter 
of the formal dimension of movement. There is also a transcendental 
dimension of life that may be connected with the latter motif, but doesn’t 
coincide with it.52  
 
Conclusion: The First Movement and the Earth that Does 
Not Move 
In the 1970 afterword we have already referred to in this essay, Patočka 
speaks quite unequivocally of humans as belonging to a world in the strong 
sense of nature, and he does so on the basis of movement. Yet he is always 
talking about our movement, or about a movement of existents becoming in 
the world, never about a movement of the world itself—a movement that 
would first make this belonging-to-the-world possible. Of course, this is in no 
way a denial of such belonging. Even when Patočka links movement with the 
lived/physical body, directing his attention to this above all, what is 
important to him, particularly in relation to the so-called first movement of 
life, is to emphasize its cosmic dimension, and hence the belonging of human 
life to nature in the old sense of phusis. 
Nevertheless, the corporeality of all motion keeps before our eyes the fact 
that, insofar as we move, take action, and in so acting understand at once 
ourselves and things, we are part of nature, phusis, the all-embracing world. 
When interested and occupied above all with human relations and social 
functions, living in and for work, organization, struggle and competition, we 
tend to forget this natural aspect and, at the same time, our relationship to the 
all-embracing phusis. The first of our fundamental, overall movements, the 
movement of anchoring or sinking roots, which grounds the other two, is, 
however, most suitable to remind us of this supremacy of phusis in the whole 
of our life. In fact, all our actions, including precisely work and struggle, take 
place solely on the basis of this instinctive-affective prime motion, which 
constitutes so to say the ostinato of life’s polyphony.53 
The confrontation of Patočka’s philosophy with philosophical cosmology 
is thus thoroughly legitimate and productive, and its intensive reception in 
the last fifteen years owes much to this confrontation. 
What links his own revisions of transcendental phenomenology together, 
and what comes into the foreground in the final decades of his work, is the 
insight that the medium of our encounter with individual items in the world 
is to be grasped as movement. As already mentioned, however, Patočka in no 
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way speaks of a cosmological movement of the world itself—in, say, the sense 
of a primary manifestation—but always simultaneously speaks of two 
movements: the medium of the correlation is “our own movement within the 
framework of the world and the movement of everything that can occur and 
appear in the world.”54 The life of human beings is therefore to be characterized 
in general as “the movement of a world-beings,” in the sense that it “never 
brings about anything specifically human without this being related—tacitly 
or explicitly—to the preceding whole.”55 Yet how is this world-relation to be 
realized concretely? 
In this connection Patočka speaks (not only in the essay cited here, but 
also in his other writings) first and foremost of the earth as the indispensable 
referent of every movement. The earth is “above all the firm foothold and 
foundation of any movement—ours as well as that of other things.”56 
Although in its transcendental function, the earth is to be the primal 
factual support for the sense-constituting movement of life, the earth itself 
does not move: it makes a cosmic power of nature present, one that penetrates 
everything living and holds sway in all life as a result. Instead of being related 
to life as its object, as that which responds to its intentionality, the earth also 
underlies the human relation to the whole, albeit unthematically. 
If it is movement on both sides of the correlation that makes this possible, 
and if this has a common denominator—namely, making an existent in 
general what it is, without any recourse to an already existing substrate—then 
this means that the beings become being in the world through reciprocal 
movement, through the intertwining of both movements. They are not first 
individuated in and through the movement of the cosmos in order to become 
the beings in the world—phenomenalized in relation to the life-centers, the 
incarnated subjectivities—only secondarily. On the contrary, Patočka 
repeatedly tells us that the life to be grasped as this movement is originally 
the life that would be human life as the movement whereby beings become 
without substrates already underlying this movement as what bears it. This 
lived, subjective bodily movement cannot be reduced to any other movement, 
and is even awarded a certain priority in its phenomenological accessibility. 
This obviously doesn’t mean that this movement could happen 
autonomously, occurring of itself without being related to something that 
calls for it—and for its part, enables it—as an external realization of its 
possibilities. Neither of these two movements is possible prior to the other of 
them when it is a matter of a being becoming what it is: the so-called 
ontological or ontogenetic movement is possible exclusively within this 
reciprocity or correlation. This irreducibility of the movement of life to Fink’s 
cosmic “play without a player,”57 as well as the phenomenological priority of 
the correlation of inner and outer in one’s own lived/physical body as 
opposed to the cosmological difference, is spelled out in a December 1968 
lecture Patočka gave in Freiburg at the invitation of Eugen Fink.58 
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Even when for Patočka as well, the world as a whole can be thought 
with—in Fink’s terms—the play of appearing that yields time and space as 
the ultimate framework of the encounter between life and this externality, life 
nevertheless remains confronted at the limits of the pregiven world with a 
non-appearing strangeness, with something alien that withdraws from this 
framework of the world as a whole. In our opinion, however, what such 
confrontation with something beyond the world points to is the margin of the 
world as a whole rather than a cosmos that sets everything in order, a cosmos 
that the world as a whole only mirrors subjectively-relatively on any given 
occasion—an ordering cosmos that now shines through the world as a whole 
and encompasses the latter without residue, for with the construction of such 
an ordering cosmos, the strangeness of the external would merely be reduced 




1 Written within the framework of the research project “Eugen Fink and French 
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as a Philosophical Problem, trans. Erika Abrams (Evanston: Northwestern University 
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Human World,” [1972] in: Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz. 
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8 Patočka, The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, 160. 
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are represented, illuminated by our mind.” Patočka, O zjevování, 249. For the the 
reference to the lecture itself see Patočka, Body, Community, Language, 118.  
11 Patočka, The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, 159–60. 
12 In the lecture manuscript cited in the preceding note (n. 7), one can read the 
following explicit statement immediately after the passage on the “double appearing” 
in Fink: “In contrast, our manner of separation includes a reference to everything at 
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is concerned with the same issue of the status of the lived/physical body that we are 
alluding to here. See Barbaras, Appartenance: Vers une cosmologie 
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Martinus Nijhoff, 1957); Fink, Sein, Wahrheit, Welt. Vor-Fragen zum Problem des 
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